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Abstract A real but typical case of identity fraud is used to open up the complex
web of identification systems in Brazil. It is argued that identification has two poles
related to the nature of citizenship—repression and inclusion—and that reactions
from citizens to new identification schemes can be attributed to how they view the
purpose of the cards in these terms. In Brazil, a sense of inclusion and citizenship
based on a fear of anonymity and exclusion predominates leading to widespread
support amongst even critics of state activities. However, this may be undermined by
the lack of state preparation for an information society, particularly the absence of
meaningful data protection laws.
Keywords Brazil . Citizenship . Identification . Identity . Social inclusion .
Surveillance
Introduction
In most modern nation-states, entering into a relationship with the state demands
forms of identification of the person by the state (Dandeker 1990; Torpey 2000;
Bauman 2004; Lyon 2009). This relationship is more or less voluntary depending on
the state and on the subject of the relationship. In most advanced liberal
democracies, the nature of identification is based on the nature of citizenship, and
as Valentin Groebner (2007) has pointed out this connection between identification
and citizenship only became more widespread in the Twentieth Century. Before this
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time, identification had been either for specific purposes or specific groups or classes
of people, and most interactions depended on a more everyday knowledge of
identity. However, as Zygmunt Bauman (2004) argues, “the nascent modern state…
faced the need to evolve an order no longer reproduced by the well-settled and
closely-knit ‘societies of mutual familiarity’” (19). The kinds of identity based on
personal knowledge and trust did not function in larger, more complex communities.
However, the loss of an understood identity (however much this was already a social
construct) means that “‘identification’ becomes more important for the individuals
desperately seeking a ‘we’ to which they may bid for access” (ibid, 24). In other
words, forms of inclusive (and exclusive) citizenship, with identification systems to
determine who belongs in and out, provide (at least partial) replacements for locality
and class-based forms of community.
What is meant by citizenship is complex and varied but usually consists of some
or all of the following: the ability of citizens to establish claims to entitlement,
fundamental to most being a recourse to the law (to protect person and property),
secondly the ability to cast a vote, and something that is generally more recent in
most states, the right to some kind of support from the state (educational, medical, or
financial). Conversely, citizenship also allows the state to acquire funds from citizens
through direct or indirect taxation, to support the entitlements of citizens, and to
maintain ‘order’. In state-thinking, identification, as James C. Scott (1998) argues,
has the general aim of increasing the ‘legibility’ of the citizen, to make the job of
government easier and more efficient. Both Jane Caplan (2001) and Valentin
Groebner (2007) also point out, the ‘utopia’ of early modern Prussian jurist and
philosopher, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, was no only that individuals should be
identifiable but also that ‘no-one must remain unknown to the police’ (Fichte 1796
in Groebner 2007: 229). Of course the state is far from simply ‘the police’, but it
draws attention to the question of the boundaries of citizenship—and in particular of
what it is about the citizen that is to be known, in other words of the question of
privacy, and particularly of its limits. Danilo Doneda (2000) points out the
importance of defining the boundaries in the balance between citizenship and the
risk of privacy loss. He uses the Human Genome Project to exemplify the difficulty
of finding such limits between what could be potentially good for a variety of
medical research fields but also more dangerous in terms of association of identity
and identification to specific (and immutable) genetic code profiles. One can make
similar argument about the use of biometric technologies for identification.
However other boundaries are also being transgressed. As Nikolas Rose (1999)
persuasively argued, these forms of identification are no longer just a product of
state activity, they also depend on and are enacted in relationships with private
entities: corporations—both as employees and as consumers—and other citizens.
Further, David Lyon (2009) has claimed recently that we must reconsider the
conceptualisation of identification to take into account the role of the private sector
in providing the means of identification, and often in promoting and justifying
certain forms of identification technology, particularly so-called ‘smart cards’ and
advanced biometrics, and in pushing global standardisation and interoperability. This
is where identification starts to meld with surveillance, as ID is used to fix people in
increasingly shared banks of information on individuals and groups. The right to
privacy, for example, acquires new and emblematic characteristics when, as Doneda
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(2006b: 5) argues, we seem to be witnessing the transformation of what has been
declared by the North-American Judge Thomas Cooley in the 19th Century as the
“right to be let alone” into something like the “right to control the use made by
others of information about me”. In other words, by posing the privacy problem as
one of control, not only is the identification-surveillance connection reinforced and
privacy becomes something rather more malleable and fluid. We would argue that
the combination of surveillance and identification is one key aspect of what
constitutes a ‘surveillance society’ (Lyon 2001; Murakami Wood et al. 2006) or
indeed what Deleuze (1990) called a ‘control society’. There is in this context, a
need to consider the political economy, not just the sociology, of identification and
surveillance (Lyon 2009).
The caring, inclusive, rights-based society and the repressive, control society are
the two ends of the spectrum of citizenship, identification and surveillance and this
has been at the heart of the enterprise of Surveillance Studies (see Lyon 2007). As
Bauman (2004: 32) astutely remarks “in our world of ‘individualization’, identities
are mixed blessings. They vacillate between a dream and a nightmare, and there is
no telling when one will turn into another”. However, even in the era of
globalisation, the distinctiveness of national trajectories of identification remains
important. Not every nation-state has the same history of identification, and not
every nation has the same reasons for establishing, maintaining or changing the
identification systems that they use. Historically, identification has been used for
both purposes (see the range identified in Caplan and Torpey 2001), and a variety of
identification systems and purposes can continue to be seen worldwide (Bennett and
Lyon 2008). General and generic arguments about surveillance society do not serve
us unless they are made with some greater awareness of the interactions of history,
place and culture (Murakami Wood 2009). States can be more or less inclusive and
repressive, the specifics are important and the caring end of the spectrum—
surveillance that relates to welfare, health, education, social inclusion, and even
empowerment, for example—still needs greater emphasis.
In this paper, we examine the case of Brazil. We use a story of one citizen’s
growing awareness of the importance of his multiple forms of identification that
resulted from his experience of identity fraud. We are not going to elaborate much on
identity fraud beyond the story rather to use it, as has the protagonist, to discover
more about the bureaucracy of state-citizen relationships in Brazil. The paper also
draws on participant observation of interactions around identification, everyday
conversations with Brazilians, and several interviews conducted in Curitiba, São
Paulo, Brasília and Rio de Janeiro with experts, bureaucrats and politicians between
January and April 2009.
The argument of the paper is that there are two broad and opposing categories of
fears that drive citizens’ reactions to state identification schemes, which map closely
to the two poles of inclusion and repression. The first is the one that is more familiar
in states like the USA and the UK, which is the nightmare of order, in which privacy
is destroyed as the state becomes over-intrusive and controlling. However the other
is the fear of exclusion, in which the citizens’ greatest concern is to be unknown and
therefore potentially to disappear as the victim of arbitrary forces. We argue that in
the Brazilian case, the latter is almost universal, and that the fear of anonymity and
being ‘lost’ is far stronger than any concern about surveillance or control, and that
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this is far stronger when it comes to the relationship of identification to social class.
Here in fact, it is the poorest in Brazil—those who are at the greatest risk of such
‘disappearance’—who are most likely to favour state identification schemes as
mechanisms of inclusion. However, throughout Brazilian society, this existential
fear, which rests in the nature of Brazilian citizenship, provides a strong basis for
support for better state identification. This calls into question universalising
theories of the control society of surveillance society, but rather than dismiss
them entirely, it leads us to argue for subtle adjustments, arguing for the
existence of multiple surveillance societies, with distinct contextual nuances and
levels of intrusion as well as different concerns regarding privacy, anonymity and
control.
Identification, identity and fraud: the case of an ordinary Brazilian citizen
On a relaxing Sunday afternoon in September 2006, Carlos da Silva,1 a 30-
something middle-class professional living in the state of São Paulo, received a call
from a telephone company, “TelecomX”, asking for his name and CPF (registry of
physical persons), advising him that he had a debt with them for some calls using
their prefix of a telephone account in the state of Santa Catarina, in the South of
Brazil. This was puzzling to Carlos, as at that time, he had never been in to the more
southerly parts of the country.
It was also unusual to receive any call from a corporation on a Sunday, and as
Brazilians are always on the alert for someone trying to take advantage of them,
Carlos immediately refused to confirm his data as he suspected that it might be one
of the ways some malicious people might use to acquire his personal details. After
getting the company’s registered toll-free number, Carlos explained the situation
trying to check the veracity of the story, which he found, unfortunately to be true.
The company was trying to assess whether Carlos recognized these calls made in
another state from an account in his name, and thus to ask whether he recognized the
debt. He was given the option of contesting the debt and the origins of this account,
in order to clear his name and close the debts, which he of course did.
Then they informed Carlos that the telephone account was registered to another
company, “TelecomY”, and that he would need to call them directly in order to close
the account and clear any possible debts. These debts also turned out to be all too
real, and Carlos had to go through a similar process of contesting them with call-
centre workers in order to discover that he had, in fact, two different accounts
opened on his behalf, one in the state of Santa Catarina and the other in the state of
Paraná (where Carlos now lives, but where he had never been at that time).
All these issues were apparently resolved in less than forty-eight hours by the
companies’ credit and customer departments. Carlos’s name was not registered as a
debt-defaulter with any credit-referencing agency in these cases, and he had not paid
too much attention to the situation as a whole because everything was so easily
resolved.
1 For obvious reasons, all personal details have been altered, so we have used fictional names for people
and institutions.
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In the mid-2007, Carlos moved to Curitiba, capital of the state of Paraná, to take
up a new job. There are different regional mobile telephone prefixes across Brazil
and while trying to transfer his mobile account he was refused the registration by the
mobile company, with the argument that his name was appearing on one of the credit
protection systems as a known-debtor.2 As a good-payer who pays all bills promptly,
he was surprised by the news and forced to do the transfer using his wife’s account.
Thus, besides feeling embarrassed in front of the attendant, he had to have his own
mobile phone registered to his wife, which although it was not a problem in itself, it
added to the general confusion.
The next step then, for Carlos, was to approach the credit-referencing agencies to
find out what debts ‘he’ had and with which companies. By this stage, Carlos was
not surprised to find out that apparently he had had two mobile phone accounts with
yet another mobile company, “TelecomZ”, in the city of Barbacena in the state of
Minas Gerais, far away from where he lived and another place to which he had never
been. After going through a nightmare of transferred and unresolved phone calls to
different call-centre operatives and departments, TelecomZ informed him that the
accounts had been opened sometime around September 2006. Carlos had no more
problem than before in cancelling these accounts and debts, and the call-centre
operator told him that complaints department was used to this kind of situation
because of the number of frauds they had to deal with. Carlos began to realize that
he did not even have to explain his case in any detail as he was seemingly just one
more victim calling to contest improper debts. They already knew everything he had
to say. And they were very quick on taking his name off the credit-reference agency
lists with apologies, as further embarrassments could lead them being taken to court.
By this time, however, Carlos had become a lot more concerned with the situation
of his identity documents. As it is usually impossible to open mobile telephone
accounts in Brazil without several forms of ID (for reasons we will come back to
later), it was clear that he had become a victim of effective and systematic
identification fraud. Thus, he decided to take the situation a lot more seriously and
went to the police to report what had happened to him. He went to a special unit of
the Civil Police charged with dealing with crimes of fraud,3 and reported all stories
including the cases he originally found out back in 2006. The police officer
instructed him to call TelecomZ and ask them to provide all legal documents and
contracts used to open the two accounts on his behalf.
Surprisingly enough, the call-centre operators told him that no documents were
physically shown or contracts signed in order to open the account and buy the
mobile phone. Everything was carried out by telephone, so the fraudster had only
given them Carlos’s ID numbers and personal details, and opted to receive the phone
2 As this transfer operation was administratively treated by the mobile company as the opening of a new
account, they had to run credit checks over Carlos’ name through different online credit protection
systems.
3 The system of police in Brazil is now quite complex, but originally followed the European model of an
armed ‘gendarmerie’, focused on enforcement, known as the Polícia Militar (Military Police) and a
separate ‘detective’ force, the Polícia Civil (Civil Police). These police are based in the 27 separate states
that make up the Brazilian federation. More recently, a Polícia Federal (Federal Police) has been set up to
deal with national-level criminal activity like smuggling and large-scale fraud and corruption. In many
cities, mayors have also created Guarda Municipal (Municipal Guard), a less well-trained but supposedly
more ‘civic’ force to deal with neighbourhood issues.
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by post. It was very frustrating to Carlos to see that the fraudsters were having much
less trouble using his details to open accounts and buy things than he was in trying
to prove who he was and clear his false debts and his good name.
At the police station, the officer tried to calm Carlos by telling him how common
these crimes are, and that his case was not even close to the worse scenarios he had
encountered, like exactly copied identification documents with altered pictures and
fingerprints, and people being arrested because of crimes committed by other people
carrying their cloned IDs. Then he advised Carlos on how to deal with these
situations in the future: first and more importantly, he should carry the police report
with him at all times, at least to give himself the benefit of the doubt in case he was
mistaken as a possible fraudster or criminal. Secondly, the officer offered him two
options: Carlos could either report that he had been a victim of fraud with
commercial and credit-referencing agencies—which would make it increasingly
more difficult for him to carry out ordinary transactions, and also that it would
become more and more difficult to prove that he really was who he said he was (but
of course, even more so for the fraudsters)—or, alternatively, to run regular checks
with the credit-referencing agencies in order to see if there were something wrongly
associated with his name, and in this case, to go through all the same ‘cleaning’
procedures all over again.4
Carlos opted for the latter, and now lives well aware of the risks of having his
identification numbers—but not necessarily the actual documents, there has been no
direct evidence of that yet—copied and used all over Brazil. He feels like his IDs are
just ‘out there’ circulating on lists bought and sold between criminals. And of
course, Carlos is not comfortable about that and does not even know when and how
often it will be that he will have to prove who he is, even if he just wants to rent a
DVD or buy a mobile phone.
The Brazilian web of identification systems
In every nation-state, there are particular things that citizens take for granted, more
than anything else. These things are not always the same. For some, it is democracy,
or the free market, or the welfare state. In Brazil, one of these things that is very
deeply embedded in the way of life so that people do not even think about it very
much, is the prevalence of the need for identification, or rather, the overlapping
system of many different tokens of identification attached to every single citizen
from the poorest to the richest, in many different ways, for multiple purposes. Brazil
is certainly not unique in this way, but it is a particularly clear example of society
where a large percentage of everyday interactions between citizen and state, and
citizens and the private sector, and even sometimes between citizens themselves,
require the presentation of either identification numbers or tokens of identification,
and often more than one on each occasion.
4 Several authors have noted the way in which identity fraud and theft discourses and remedial processes
have clearly disciplinary functions, that responsibilize the citizen (see e.g. Caeton 2007; Marron 2008;
Whitson and Haggerty 2008; Monahan 2009).
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The question of why mobile telephony is so prominent in this story is one such
example. We had been told by many people that so much information was collected
by phone companies because of laws, requested by the Federal Police, which would
allow them to identify and monitor the communications by drug barons in federal
prisons. It was said that they could have blocked the signals from prisons, but
instead the information from monitoring was considered to be so valuable in the
provision of evidence that a detailed nationwide system of registration of mobile
telephone accounts was considered preferable to blocking signals, however intrusive
on innocent citizen’s lives. This sounded like an implausible conspiracy theory, but it
was confirmed in interview with the Federal Police.5 Any interaction involving
mobile telephony—purchasing handsets or SIM cards, changing numbers etc.—is
therefore subject to quite extensive bureaucratic identification and record-keeping
procedures (see below).
The first token of identification a citizen will receive is the Birth Certificate
(Certidão de Nascimento), which for many years is the only official paper that a
person will have. This in itself is not something that can be taken for granted. The
requirement to register births (and marriages and deaths) was only introduced in
1939 as part of the Estado Novo dictatorship of Getúlio Vargas and despite the lack
of places to register births especially in rural and poor or informal communities,
without the birth certificate none of the other papers needed later in life could be
issued. Systems for retrospective registration were introduced but even after reforms,
these still required procedures involving lawyers, courts, witnesses and other
corroborating papers (see Fischer 2008).
Then there are various papers associated with school—which are too numerous
and specific to be listed here. As soon as Brazilians become teenagers and there is
any kind of need to prove to officials and shops who they are (so, as a means of
governmental identification control as to fill a police report or as a credit guarantee
while registering with the local DVD rental shop), they are issued with what is
known as the nationwide Identity Card (Carteira de Identidade) which is more
generally referred to as the RG (Registro Geral, the General Registry, the database,
to which the card is the link). The RG is supposed to be taken wherever a Brazilian
goes. Although it is often asserted that ID cards in Brazil are also a product of the
Estado Novo, the origins of the RG actually pre-date this regime. As Brodwyn
Fischer (2008) observes, they were (and are) local rather than national, and in Rio de
Janeiro for example, they grew out of police identification initiatives that were
intended to help them identify criminals. The Rio Military Police Identification
Service remains at the forefront of ID technology in Brazil. And the cards were far
from compulsory. The foundational law of 1923 actually made it quite difficult to
obtain an ID card, requiring such pre-existing forms of proof of identity as a letter
from the police, verifiable evidence of parents’ identity, proof of date and place of
birth (which as we have seen, few people would have had at this point), and more
(Fischer 2008). These original ID cards were a mark of a special form of privileged
5 Interview with Delegado Romulo Berredo of the Polícia Federal, Brasilia, February 2009. The question
of why the police really monitor the calls of drug traffickers remains open, with many informants arguing
that corruption (based on the ability to know when and where large drug deliveries were taking place) was
the real reason…
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inclusion as a specific kind of economic actor, not a tool of generalised discipline or
control.
Even as it is being replaced (see below), for most people, the current RG card (see
Figs. 1 and 2 below) is a double-sided piece of thick paper, just larger than a credit
card. It is oriented vertically at the front and horizontally at the back. It cross-
Fig. 1 2008 Brazilian Carteira de Identidade (Front) (Source: Authors)
Fig. 2 2008 Brazilian Carteira de Identidade (Back) (Source: Authors)
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references the Registry of Physical Persons (CPF or Cadastro de Pessoas Físicas)—
to which we will come back later—and also birth certification (it lists the full names
of both mother and father and city and state of origin). It is issued at state, rather than
federal level.
The RG is intended to be a comprehensive identification method, but in real life it
does not work like this and Brazilians pay little attention to this document. As they
grow older and adult responsibilities become more important, they are issued a
unique number which is demanded for almost every single transaction they carry out
in the country. From progress through school and college to opening a bank account,
or buying a mobile phone and—especially—paying taxes, in other words virtually any
transaction someone gets involved with in normal life, they need what is called literally
the Registry of Physical Persons (CPF) card, but basically a ‘taxpayer’s card’. The CPF
is the current descendant of the carteira profissional (CP) (often called carteira de
trablaho (CT) or Labour Card) introduced in 1932 and then extended and detailed in
the 1934 Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho (Consolidation of Labour Laws, or CLT).
As the early local ID cards also did in a less direct way through the onerous evidential
requirements needed to obtain them, the CP/CT created a clear division between some
who were included and others who were excluded. In this case, the divide was between
those who were defined as ‘workers’ and others. It would be more accurate in political
economic terms to define this as a division between formal and informal workers, but
here, the term ‘workers’ had a specific meaning in the terms of the law. This division
has nominally been erased from the current CPF, although in many ways the division
that the CPF creates is a more profound one and one that was always just under the
surface of the CP/CT system: a division not around labour, or even citizenship, but
something more fundamental, personhood. As the label of worker came to acquire
social value, those that were ‘not workers’ were correspondingly devalued and their
status as equal citizens and equal people was eroded. The fear that one could become
less than a person—someone unrecognised and anonymous—remains the key fear
driving support for identification schemes in Brazil.
As taxation of persons and companies/institutions are made separately in Brazil,
there is also a different registration number for what in the Portuguese tradition is
referred to as a Juridical Person, or Cadastro Nacional de Pessoas Jurídicas (CNPJ).
Receita Federal (Brazil’s IRS or Inland Revenue) runs separate taxation systems for
persons and companies/institutions, meaning that every person (officially registered
as a taxpayer) has a CPF while every company or institution has a CNPJ. The actual
CPF document is a blue plastic card like old-style credit cards, which also has a
machine-readable magnetic strip on the back (Fig. 3).
Many other types of identification schemes run parallel to RG and CPF, such as:
the Carteira Nacional de Habiliação (driving license), voter IDs, military service
certificates, and so on. For regular commercial transactions Brazilians are usually
required to produce at least the RG, CPF and a proof of address (which can be any kind of
official bill). In some specific kinds of registration processes, Brazilians need to show
even their voter ID (together with the proof that they voted in the last election, as this is
compulsory in Brazil) and military service certificate (for males only). There is a separate
system of identification for foreign residents, the Registro Nacional de Estrangeiros.
The driving license which, despite its name, is issued at state rather than national-
level differs in colour and format from state-to-state, having, however, pretty much
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the same level of information and cross-identification with other forms of ID.
Figure 4 shows the one from Paraná, which is a paper usually folded in half
horizontally. It is specifically forbidden to laminate it.
One final form of identification is proving to be very important, especially for
those marginalised by poverty and not possessing some of the other forms of
identification. This is the Programa Bolsa Família (PBF, or Family Grant Program),
one of the cornerstones of the socially progressive politics of the current Brazilian
government.6 The PBF was set up by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (‘Lula’)
during his first administration to unify, simplify and extend the previous multiple,
often contradictory and difficult to administer number of social programs. Such
programs again originated during the Estado Novo, however the Abono Família
created by the 1941 Lei de Família was, like many of the other programs of the time,
strongly symbolic and difficult to claim in practice without a relatively high degree
of literacy and knowledge. This led to a very small take-up related to need, and in
any case favoured those already in work who were able, again, to show who they
were (Perlmann 1976; Fischer 2008). Once again, the system was one which made a
clear division and a privileged inclusion.
The PBF in contrast provides a very simple, small but direct payment to families
with children, for each child, provided that the children go to school and have
medical check-ups. Underlying the entitlement is massive compulsory collection of
personal information through the Cadastro Único para Programas Sociais
(CadÚnico, or Single Register for Social Programs).7 This is, of course, a database
7 http://www.mds.gov.br/bolsafamilia/o_programa_bolsa_familia/cadastro_unico/o-que-e-1.
Fig. 3 2008 Brazilian Cadastro de Pessoas Físicas card (Source: Authors)
6 http://www.mds.gov.br/bolsafamilia/.
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system which, as the CadÚnico website states, “funciona como um instrumento de
identificação e caracterização socioeconômica das famílias brasileiras” (“functions as
a means of identification and socioeconomic characterization of Brazilian families”).
Like most Brazilian state financial systems, CadÚnico is operated through the federal
bank, the Caixa Econômica Federal (CAIXA). The CadÚnico database is founded on
“um número de identificação social (NIS) de caráter único, pessoal e intransferível”
(“a unique, personal and non-transferable Social Identification Number or NIS”).
Entitlement to this program is demonstrated with yet another card, the patriotic
yellow and green Cartão PBF (Fig. 5). Like the CPF card, which—apart from
colour—it very much resembles, this is a magnetic strip card rather than a smart
card, and is required for all transactions involving the PBF. Also like the CPF, but
unlike many other forms of Brazilian ID, it has nothing more than the name of the
recipient and the CadÚnico number printed on it. In this case the recipient is generally
the mother of the children being claimed for, a progressive and practical measure
shared with other contemporary family entitlement programs in Brazil.
Fig. 4 Carteira Nacional de Habiliação (Source: Authors)
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Given the previous generations of family programs which followed the precedent
set by the 1941 law, it is important to note that many of those entitled to the PBF,
and consequently to receive the PBF card, do not have to have CPF, RG or other
tokens of identification. In many, but not all cases, these people are not tax payers or
do not take part in many transactions that most people from higher social classes
would find ordinary (they may not have bank accounts or mobile phones, for
example). This makes the program accessible but it is undeniable that, apart from
being a social program, the PBF is also a way for the government to acquire personal
details and identify people normally excluded from regular forms of identification
and data sorting. The key question, and one which we shall attempt to answer in the
concluding section, is whether this increase in surveillance is actually any kind of
social or political problem.
The insecurity of identification in Brazil
Despite these multiple forms of identification which one needs for every transaction
with the state and many private organisations too, they are highly insecure. What is
more, as we have seen, all these are not just numbers in a database somewhere but
material documents, or tokens, in their own right and on each token there is a lot of
cross-identification. One example is that every personal cheque has printed on it not
only the usual information (bank name and address, bank sort code, account holder
name and account number), but also has the CPF number and the RG number. This
must be utter joy to fraudsters and identity thieves. It is probably lucky that personal
cheques are not widely accepted.
The CPF card also has the name and date of birth, and the CPF number is ubiquitous,
appearing also on the RG card and the driving license. The latter has its own 11-digit
registration number, but also has the RG number, name, and place and date of birth.
What is even more interesting is that the RG card not only contains a photo and a
thumbprint (the state database contains prints of all ten fingers and thumbs), but also
the names of both parents. This means it can be related more easily to the birth
certificate as well. This is reminiscent of the Japanese system which still prioritises the
Fig. 5 Brazilian Carteira Programa Bolsa Familia (Source: Government of Brazil)
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family above the individual in some ways (see: Murakami Wood et al. 2007) but there
is no actual equivalent of the kouseki, the Japanese family register, for example.
The Brazilian driving license is a goldmine of personal information. Partly this is
because the license had previously been intended to be a unifying piece of
identification; a practice typical of ‘autocentric’ cultures as in the example of the
USA, where the driving license is to all intents and purposes an ID system whether
this is acknowledged or not. The Brazilian license contains all the information on
both the CPF card and the RG card, and more. Following the issuing of the new
Registro de Identidade Civil (RIC) cards, there will no longer be the necessity for the
license to act as a de facto ID card, so it will be interesting to see if the quantity of
information on these licenses will be reduced or, if not, what the justification will be
for having this much easily readable personal information on one material token.
It is worth noting that the PBF card is exceptional in having such a limited
amount of information on it. As we mentioned above, rather than being a result of
some exceptional attention to the protection of the poorest families from fraud, this
is in fact simply a recognition of the fact that so few of the very poor have CPF
cards, having never worked in the formal economy or paid taxes. However the lack
of visible information means that the PBF card in itself may not be enough to claim
as a citizen would still need at least the RG card in addition to prove that they were
the named holder of the PBF card.
It is this wealth of information which is taken that produces one means by which
identification numbers flow into illicit channels. Jennifer Whitson and Kevin
Haggerty (2008) have pointed to surveys by credit providers that show that a
substantial majority of all identity frauds are the result of ‘inside jobs’, and in Brazil,
with its highly bureaucratised citizen-state and citizen-corporation relationships,
organisations store more valuable information on the individual than in most places
even as the result of everyday transactions. For example, we observed the process of
obtaining a mobile telephone in a major city in Brazil: the data demanded by the
company included the RG, CPF and CNH numbers, full name, address, and date of
birth. The payment details and credit card numbers were also taken to ensure
payment. These were copied by hand onto a single paper form that was then stored
in a simple filing cabinet. Photocopies of the relevant documents were also taken. In
one place, in one file, after a single transaction, were practically all the details of a
person, easily enough to obtain another mobile telephone account, another ID card,
or open a bank account. And there are many such everyday transactions that result in
the creation of such paper or electronic files of personal identification information.
Indeed, this seems to be exactly the process that allowed our protagonist, Carlos da
Silva, to fall victim to fraudsters.
There are two additional problems in Brazil. The first, as was pointed out in an
interview by Danilo Doneda, Brazil’s leading expert on data protection,8 is the
almost complete absence of any data protection law other than a very vague citation
to the right of data protection in general lines of the 1988 new Federal Constitution
8 Conversation with Danilo Doneda, Curitiba, February 2009. Doneda was engaged by the Brazilian
government to write a federal data protection law, but the Ministry of Justice seems to have curtailed
further progress on this project at present. However, the presence of Brazilian government officials in
Madrid may well signal a renewed effort in the direction of such a law.
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(Doneda 2006a) and the lack of any regulatory body for data protection. Indeed the
Madrid meeting of international Privacy and Data Protection Commissioners in 2009
appears to be the first one that any official Brazilian delegation has attended. As with
many South American countries, the principle of habeas data is recognised however
this is a right that requires a legal challenge to enforce, which puts it effectively beyond
the category or rights that are generally accessible. This makes Brazil almost unique
amongst democratic countries. And interviews showed that senior police officers, for
example, whilst recognising the huge problem of identity fraud, saw the solution as
purely a technical one requiring a new higher technology form of identification, not
new legal protections for the rights of citizens.9 The creation of new databases brings
with it new duties and new potential problems of data-handling, yet the response of
one interviewee was simply that if government organisations did not carry out their
duties correctly then they would lose the trust of the people.10 The problem with this
argument is that it would have to be the case that citizens already had some degree of
trust in the state, however no-one interviewed from non-government organisations, or
who were simple private citizens demonstrated such trust (and particularly not in the
police). One exception to the lack of concern over data protection is, surprisingly the
PBF. The government has set up an Observatório de Boas Práticas na Gestão do
Programa Bolsa Família (Observatory for Best Practice in the Management of the
PBF), which has a whole raft of measures to safeguard and protect the data, correct
errors and so on—in other words, data protection.11
The second factor is that the system of enrolment and issuing of identification
documents at present is chaotic and corrupt. Despite the fact that RG cards are valid,
as is stated on the top of the back, ‘in all the territory of the nation’, Brazil being a
federation, they are issued by the individual Brazilian states, which allows anyone
with any other form of ID to get a state RG card in each different state, should they
wish too. It is thus fairly easy to acquire 27 different identities in Brazil at present.
This may not present any particular concern in itself, but in a country of gang-related
violence and endemic corruption, it makes finding the perpetrators of such crimes
very difficult, and indeed facilitates the latter.
Whilst it may be easy to acquire an RG card, it is less easy to acquire a CPF number,
also required for many other government transactions, and it is a major disaster if the
citizen loses the card, or if for some reason, the CPF number is rescinded (which can
happen if someone does not pay tax in Brazil for more than a year, for example if you
are abroad, without explanation). For Brazilians, losing these documents or having
them stolen or used in illicit activities might represent a true nightmare for most daily
activities involving either relationships with the state or with private companies. These
documents are essential for everyday life and social inclusion yet, these identification
interactions could result in being arrested and accused for crimes committed in places
where the person concerned has never been. This may threaten the true identity of the
person in psychological terms in the most extreme cases of identification fraud.
9 Interview with Delegado Romulo Berredo of the Polícia Federal, Brasilia, February 2009; reinforced by
an interview with Subchefe of the Rio de Janeiro Polícia Civil, Rio de Janeiro, April 2009.
10 ibid.
11 http://www.mds.gov.br/bolsafamilia/observatorio/apresentacao.
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The case of Carlos da Silva has not reached these extremes yet, but serves to
illustrate the complex situation of having so many identification systems running
together and being used widespread without any concern for personal data and
privacy issues. Yet, now as a result of the combination of the proliferation of
identification systems, the requirement for many of these multiple forms of ID to be
used in everyday transactions and the lack of data protection, Carlos has to combine
identification interactions with a form of self-surveillance. There is a fundamental
insecurity about his identification, and therefore his everyday life. There is caring or
repressive government surveillance here to assist—and in fact, even being part of a
police investigation, as the story showed, might have meant a worse outcome in terms
of the relationship with private entities which surveil the financial profiles of citizens,
and who might well be more important to the life chances of Carlos da Silva than the
state. He therefore chooses a mild form of exclusion (from the formal mechanisms of
the legal system), however insecure this makes him feel, as protection not from the
state but from the effects of the circulation of his identification numbers (or perhaps, he
suspects, even copies of this tokens of identification) amongst criminals.
Carlos da Silva is a middle class professional however, and as we have seen,
many people who live in poor communities or in the informal housing of the favelas,
and who are involved in the shadow economy do not even have the identification
tokens or numbers which he has, in particular a CPF number, which is a severe
obstacle to social inclusion. The PBF, which intends to remedy some of these
problems, combines the provision of benefits and a particular number and token of
identification with surveillance practices. The PBF card, as a token, is designed to
generate a sense of inclusion—hence the patriotic colours—and this is reinforced by
the pictures of happy smiling PBF cardholders on government websites. This is
clearly to avoid the possibility of the PBF card becoming a stigma, like so many
other markers of entitlement to state support.
The surveillance occurs through the monitoring of school attendance by children—
for which there is a particular sub-program of the PBF called Projeto Presença
(Project Presence) with its own reporting systems12—and epidemiology and
surveillance of nutrition through the Ministry of Health, and there is lot of household
information collected to determine ‘need’. John Gilliom (2001) showed how much
Federal assistance programs in the USA could impact negatively upon the lives of
claimants, particularly women, in the Appalachian region, and revealed the everyday
forms of resistance. However, from interviews with Community Association leaders in
Rio de Janeiro, it seems that where PBF is operating effectively (and it is not doing so
everywhere), the combination of school attendance with economic assistance is seen
as a double bonus, not as a form of control.13 Attendance at school provides not only
an education which might keep kids out of gangs or early pregnancy, but also a
record with the state—in other words, it builds up those early forms of identification
which will lead to the obtaining of a CPF and ‘normal’ citizenship.
12 http://frequenciaescolarpbf.mec.gov.br/presenca/controller/login/efetuarLogin.php.
13 Interviews with Elisa, Leader of the Associação dos Moradores of Morro dos Prazeres, and Sonia,
member of the committee of the Associação dos Moradores of Santa Marta. Members of community
organisations in Tavares de Bastos noted that PBF had not really penetrated their community effectively
yet.
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From a “vast array of papers” towards a new integrated ID system
Now, in the name of security and “para integrar os bancos de dados de diversos
órgãos dos sistemas de identificação do Brasil” (to integrate the databases of the
diverse organisations of identification systems in Brazil), the Ministry of Justice is
proposing to merge some of these14—the RG, CPF, Driving License and Electoral
Registration15—, into a new, smart, Registro de Identidade Civil (RIC) card based on
a unique number (Fig. 6). The new ID card has been a long time coming. It
originated well before the post-9/11 panic and surveillance surge, with Federal Law
9454/1997, and was originally conceived of largely in terms of a database
integration project. However it was not funded until 2004. The process of enrolment
and issuing of the new cards was due to have started in January 2009 in the
poorer and remote northern and north-eastern states, with the aims of registering
20 million people per year, which would lead to the entire population being
covered by 2017.
According to the Ministry of Justice (see note 10), the system will lead to “a
identificação civil no Brasil ainda mais eficiente” (“a much more efficient civil
identification system in Brazil”) and “estabelecer uma relação de unicidade entre o
cidadão e seu documento” (“establish a relationship of uniqueness between the
citizen and their document”).
It is notably that the plan will also create a nationwide fingerprint database,
something that the state has so far not created even for law enforcement as in many
other advanced democracies (Cole 2001). Given the complete lack of laws on data-
sharing and data-protection, it seems highly likely that this database will be
accessible to the police services. Unlike in the UK however, the enterprise is not
conceptualised in a punitive way—there is no indication of punishment for non-
compliance with the issuing of the cards or provision of person data.
The whole basis on which identity cards and database issues is being considered
in Brazil is entirely different from other contemporary proposed introductions,
particularly that of the UK. Interviews with Brazilian community leaders, human
rights advocates16 and the police demonstrated widespread support across the
political spectrum in favour of the new system. For almost all Brazilians interviewed
or questioned more casually, the new ID cards were not seen as a form of control or
intrusion by the state but a guarantee against the anonymity that would allow abuses
by the state or indeed by other malicious persons. Some felt this attitude was so
strong that it was something fundamental to Brazilian thinking; for example, it was
referred to as a ‘cultural characteristic’ of Brazilians by Delegado Romulo Berredo
of the Federal Police.
A new unified identity card then provides a metaphysical and material kind of






16 Interviews with Artigo 1o and Projeto Pro Bono, São Paulo, February 2009.
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changing mixture of dictatorship, military rule and more or less democratic
republics, was not so much a nightmare of knowledge and order in the manner of
the ‘surveillance state’ of East Germany (see Garton Ash 1998) but of corrupt,
chaotic and arbitrary rule, where politics, policies and people appeared and
disappeared rapidly and where nothing seemed fixed. Even the last period of
military rule that ended in 1985 was not a unified system of totalitarian control but
was characterised by periods of both intense and seemingly arbitrary brutality and
populist developmental policies. And indeed General Vargas’s populist rule from
1930, particularly the Estado Novo dictatorship from 1937–1945, when many of
what Brodwyn Fischer (2008) calls the “vast array of papers” that were the
precursors of the current system were first introduced, was far from being
comparable to Nazism or Fascism. Vargas in fact extended the electoral franchise
and introduced many programs for social inclusion and citizenship.
However, whatever the intent, James Holston (2008) argues that the Estado Novo
relied extensively on superficial signs and spectacles of citizenship rather than
genuine inclusion. This analysis is largely supported in a contemporaneous work by
Fischer, who argues that the Vargas regime “forged an idealized form of Brazilian
citizenship, creating a wide array of political, social and economic rights that gave
working people hope in the possibilities of law and politics” (2008: 2). However the
citizenship reforms, like the original citizenship, were inequitable in practice for
several reasons. Firstly, the existence of new documents created a powerful set of
bureaucratic intermediaries who were (and are) able to create arbitrary obstacles to
the obtaining, contents and use of the documents. As Fischer comments, “each of
these documents was a passport to a specific realm of rights; and each of these
documents of Brazilian citizenship had its paper signifier and without it none
could enter” (ibid: 120). Secondly, the process encouraged corruption in order to
overcome these obstacles, leading “the very poor to depend heavily on patrons and
shady intermediaries or to act extra-legally—presenting false witnesses and papers,
lying about birth dates, bribing notaries—in order to secure their legal rights”
(ibid: 125).
Thirdly, the 1934 CLT created a system of labour-based identification that divided
rather than united. This was because of the moral element—essentially a worker’s
Fig. 6 2009 Government mock-up of the new Brazilian ID card
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card “became a powerful symbol of righteous citizenship… outside of the
workplace” (ibid: 128). In some ways, the CPF card still maintains this distinction,
and although the inclusivity offered by the PBF goes some way to challenging this,
Brazilian citizenship has always been one which from its beginning has been almost
ubiquitous but never something which conferred equal rights. Holston (2008) refers
to this as ‘differentiated citizenship’. But it was actually after the Estado Novo, that
this differentiation led to increasing association of the possession of identification
papers with the psychological ‘nature’ of their bearers—and correspondingly, the
nature of those who did not possess them. By the period of renewed republican
democracy from 1950–1964, the police would commonly take the complaints of
those with papers more seriously, they were seen as having ‘good character’ and
those without would be ignored or even subjected to arbitrary violence (Fischer
2008). In other words, the absence of a worker’s card, or eventually any identifying
papers, became associated with a lack of personhood. The non-identifiable were
non-persons, non-humans, and could therefore be ‘disappeared’ more easily. Such
disappearances only became a daily reality in the military regime of 1964–1988 and
the advent of both state and private death squads, however they continue to operate
today under the euphemistic moniker of autodefesas communitárias (‘community
self-defence organisations’, or ADCs).
This brief account shows that arguments about the inclusiveness of the Estado
Novo identification regime can be taken too far (and Vargas was hardly a progressive
democrat), but it does point out the danger of making a simplistic equation of the
introduction of identification systems with fascism or authoritarianism as if this in
itself is enough to explain the perceived moral wrongness of state identification. It
has been almost a commonplace to argue that Fichte’s police state might be realised
in the post-9/11 climate, with tendencies towards an increasingly totalitarian
identification discourse (e.g. Robertson 2006). However even Fichte’s strong vision
of the ideal police state was also framed within an enlightenment discourse of
‘rights.’ One particular right now often forgotten in analysis of identification in the
global north is the right to registration of identity itself. Simon Szreter (2007: 67)
provides a powerful reminder of this progressive understanding of the relationship of
the state and identity, reminding us that such a right is at the heart of the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and arguing that:
Without the legally sanctioned, secure, and practically available capacity to
prove one’s identity, the political rhetoric of human rights, and the academic
discourse of entitlements, functionings, and capabilities… remains at best, a set
of ideals and aspirations for the world’s anonymous poor
Based on a re-analysis of the history of British welfare regimes from the Sixteenth
Century onwards, he makes a strong claim that “registration can… be a multi-faceted
institutional mechanism for simultaneously promoting economic growth, population
health, and welfare” (ibid: 79), and that arguments that registration systems facilitate
totalitarianism and genocide are as facile as arguing that railway systems facilitate
such things because both were used by the Nazis.
Thus in Brazil, the introduction of a unitary identification system is seen not so
much evidence of a scheme to control individuals but a way to ward off chaos, the
dangerous anonymity that can lead to total disappearance, and increase certainty and
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ultimately personhood. It is part of a loose and ever-changing bundle of elements
associated with the improvement of both governance and the human condition—but
generally not with control. In many ways, this contains elements of ‘magical
thinking’: a universal ID will not stop bullets. But it does provide a way in which the
differentiations of past conceptions of differentiated citizenship progressively disappear,
and are replaced instead by the confirmation of a positive identity (in the wider sense of
the word). Fischer (2008) quotes an old woman she encountered in a Rio favela in the
mid-1990s who said that with ID papers, she was finally able to “feel like a person.”
Such sentiments were not uncommon with the community leaders interviewed in 2009
when asked about the RIC system. In fact, in none of the interviews with poor and
working class contacts, including favela residents, did any interviewee express any
negative sentiments about the proposed new ID card. It was only amongst the
educated middle-class interviewees, and generally those with international connec-
tions, that any concern about state surveillance or control were expressed.
The danger, indeed the inevitability, as far as many interviewees were concerned
was not control, but the incompetence of the state. “It will never happen” was a
commonly stated belief about the new RIC ID system, or else it would get halfway and
be cancelled by a new government. Interviewees also questioned whether the new card
would really replace other tokens of identification or simply add another layer.
Certainly the CPF card will have the new unique RIC number on it, at least until the
entire enrolment program is complete and all RIC cards issued. In addition, the
number of identification systems continues to proliferate rather than diminish—for
example, plans were recently announced for a special ID card for football fans, while
some football clubs are already registering supporters in stadiums to facilitate
identification in case of violence. Not all parts of the state bureaucratic machine appear
to share the faith in reduced but clearer points of contact between state and citizen.
And of course, people were worried about criminality and corruption. Whilst the
Ministry of Justice claims it will be very safe, the new RIC will have many of the
same problems as new smart ID systems everywhere else, in that chips can be cloned
or even reprogrammed by determined fraudsters with relatively cheap equipment.
On the other hand, however, at the very least it might stop Brazilian citizens carrying
around multiple documents that list almost everything any thieves and fraudsters
need and can access without any sophisticated equipment. For someone like Carlos
da Silva, the need to prove that he is who he is would have been even harder if it had
been his unique and trusted and supposedly secure new RIC card that had been
hacked or cloned or copied. The effects could be far more devastating if, he hopes,
rather less common.
The question remains however, whether with the adoption of global standards of
identification will come new ‘global’ norms of suspicion, policing and the attempts
to fix populations in categories. Certainly this is not new in Brazil: the colonial
administration prior to independence had minutely detailed racial categories which
were maintained until long after independence (Holston 2008), and, as we have seen,
the Novo Estado attempted a new set of categorisations based around ‘labour’
(Perlmann 1976; Fischer 2008; Holston 2008). Yet, it can be argued that the trend in
contemporary Brazil is against this under the present government. At the same
time, it is well known to both Brazilian jurists and government alike that there is a
huge gap between the legislation and practical means of identification, and what
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happens to identity in the daily life; or that the traditional juridical models used in
the country are insufficient to deal with the complex and fragmented aspects of
contemporary Brazilian society (Amaral 2002). The nature of identification within
the Brazilian justice system is unfortunately a topic for which we do not have space
in this paper.
However significant problems with the view of the new Brazilian ID scheme as
inclusionary remain. Szreter (2007) recognises some of these, when he considers
what are the implications if the construction of a national system of registration and
identification is both essential for development and carried out in the interests of
the citizen. These include: the recognition of the ownership of the information by
the citizen; the existence of a democratic and strong civil society, and ideally the
operation of such systems by independent bodies overseen by the UN, or run by
UN-recognised rules. For Brazil such things are problematic, particularly the
absence of any system of oversight of state collection, storage and use of personal
data. There also remain problems with Brazilian democracy: it may be that
surveillance infrastructure has no necessary connection to totalitarianism, but it is
the tendency to rapid and violent change that is of more concern in Brazil, as well
as its ongoing lack of real depth of civil society organisations.
It is debatable, in wider the context of contemporary capitalism, whether
‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’ are the most appropriate categories for assessing
identification and surveillance. Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello (2005) have
developed the Deleuzian notion of ‘encounter’ to argue that the key categories are
those of connection and disconnection, and more importantly the ability to make and
break connections or, alternatively, have them more or less eternally determined.
Through this lens it may be that new schemes of state identification might not
empower the ‘excluded’ by creating a greater sense of inclusion, but in fact add
another layer of external determination to their connectedness, thereby rendering
them more powerless still. This needs further investigation.
Lula’s government may be attempting to bring justice, probity, efficiency and
order to a previously unjust, corrupt, inefficient and disordered state. However, if
Brazil is to establish an inclusive or empowering system of identification and
citizenship, however one defines it, it would need to have accountability built in. It
simply has no such accountability at present, and the problems of this absence will
become more apparent as its information society, and its surveillance society,
develops. One should not rule out the successful bootstrapping of one ‘good-
enough’ reform on top of another, however it may well be that any hope that the new
unitary identification scheme might provide more meaningful personhood will be as
fleeting as many previous utopian dreams.
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